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Destabilization of the internal situation 
as one of the Main threats  
to the security of russian feDeration
For the first time internal security has been clearly articulated in Russian National Se-
curity Strategy of December 2015. That is when the so-called colour revolutions and 
“radical social groups which use nationalist and extremist religious ideologies, foreign 
and international non-governmental organisations, as well as private citizens who act 
against the Russian territorial integrity and destabilise political processes” have been 
deemed the most significant challenges to the Russian security, together with the North 
Atlantic Alliance and the United States of America. As a response to such defined 
threats, Russian legislation introduced solutions that attempt to prevent the danger. 
The aim of this article is to answer the question, whether Russian authorities treat the 
destabilisation of internal situation as one of the main challenges to the Russian secu-
rity, and if yes, what are the indications of that? Does Russian legislation (especially 
from the last few years), actions of the Russian authorities and Russian subject litera-
ture, include evidence confirming this hypothesis? This article has been based on the 
analysis of the Russian National Security Strategy and legislation regarding the secu-
rity. Additionally, Russian approach to defining security (including national security) 
has been analysed. The paper also describes how the perception of the said threats to 
the Russian security has been presented in Russian subject literature.
security category anD literature review
Security category, translated from latin, is a state of no concern or anxiety (sine cura). It 
appeared in the works of philosophers and thinkers hundreds of years ago, yet security 
as a separate branch of science developed from international affairs in 20th century (as 
a result of the I World War) (Collins, 2015: 1). Since then, hundreds, if not thousands, 
of definitions have been formulated; however, the specific speculations on this topic 
are not subjects of this article.1 Security can be defined as a state (the subject is striving 
for the sense of security) or as a process (which aim is to assure the sense of security) 
(Koziej, 2011: 20) – in both cases the purpose is identical. Ian Bellamy is an example 
1 Overviews of definitions of security can be found in at least a few publications that sum up the 
research on the security category, e.g., Stańczyk (1996), Czaputowicz (1998), Collins (2015), Wil-
liams (2008). Whereas, the speculations over the concept and essence of security were carried out 
by, i.a. Konieczny (2012, Koziej (2011), Rosicki (2010), Piwowarski (2016), Hough, Malik, Moran, 
Pilbeam (2015), and others.
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of a researcher who defines security as a state. According to him, the security can be 
understood as a „relative freedom from war, coupled with a relatively high expectation 
that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur” (Bellany, 1981: 
102). Whereas, an example definition of security as a process, is one by Stanisław 
Koziej: “a security of a given subject is the realm of their activity, which purpose is to 
assure the survival (existence) and freedom to fulfil one’s own interests in a danger-
ous environment, especially through taking opportunities (favourable circumstances), 
facing challenges, reducing the risk, and countering (preventing and opposing) various 
types of threats to the subjects and their interests” (Koziej, 2011: 20).
The topic of security of modern Russian Federation has not been frequently un-
dertaken in literature. Mainly cross-sectional studies which would characterise all or 
most the aspects of Russian security are missing. However, a lot of research has been 
carried out on the different types of security. In the last few years, many publica-
tions have been released on security in the context of The Arctic – predominant topics 
are the legal issues and possible militarisation of the territory (Flake, 2015; Kudinov, 
2012, 2015; Ivanov, 2015; Yegorov, 2014; Mikhaylov, 2013). There are also plenty 
of works on the matter of economic, energy and food security of Russian Federation 
(e.g., Solov’Jov, Senchagov, 2015; Karanina, Sapozhnikova, Loginov, Holkin, Ser-
gievskaya, Zurakhovskii, 2017).
Works related to the distinction between the national security and the state secu-
rity constitute a separate category. Although, in Western World (including Poland) those 
concepts are used interchangeably, recognising the existence of national states,2 Rus-
sian subject literature includes discussions about the synonymic potential of both terms. 
A. S. Rogov and Y. G. Fedotova (2013) draw attention to the fact that between 1934 
and 1992 only one concept of state security was in use; its meaning included economic, 
political and military (defence) security, along with others.3 Whereas, N. P. Gribin and 
A. V. Didenko (2010) point out that after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the term 
state security was closely associated with the security of state and socialist society, there-
fore many authors replaced it with national security. Also today, in literature and legal 
documents (e.g., in Russian National Security Strategy), the term national security, which 
meaning is synonymous to state security, is much more commonly used. Occasionally, 
a wider meaning of the term national security is being emphasised, as it adds the security 
of society and the individual to the concept of state security.
russian national security strategy
A new Russian National Security Strategy has been announced in the presidential de-
cree4 in December 2015. The update of strategy – the previous document had been 
2 In the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the terms national security and state security are 
used synonymously.
3 The term national security was not in use, because its definition did not cover the multiplicity 
of ethnic group inhabiting the territory of Soviet Union. However, the term state security accurately 
emphasised the uniformity and integrity of USSR (Rogov, Fedotova, 2013).
4 Russian Federation President’s decree “On the Russian Federation’s National Security Strat-
egy” (No. 683) of 31 December 2015.
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issued in 2009 – has been carried out as a response to the Western World’s actions after 
the Russian annexation of Crimea (i.a., economic sanctions), as well as the Federa-
tion’s internal issues (i.a., economic crisis, anti-government protests). One of its main 
elements is the definition of national strategy, which is “the state in which an indi-
vidual, society and state are protected from internal and external threats, and which as-
sures the rights and freedoms of the citizens of the Russian Federation, decent quality 
and standard of life, sovereignty, independence, state and territorial integrity, as well 
as a stable social-economic development of the Russian Federation. National security 
comprises state defence and all types of security foreseen in the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation and in Russian Federation’s acts, mainly national, social, informa-
tional, ecological, economic, transport and energy security, as well as the security of 
an individual” (Ukaz, 2015).
In following parts, the authors of the strategy distinguish the main challenges to the 
security of Russia, and point out the objects that can either directly or indirectly threat-
en the security. Firstly, the document emphasises the dangers coming from the United 
States of America and their allies, which try to pressure Russia in various ways, e.g., 
politically, economically or militarily, through striving to maintain their dominance in 
global matters. Secondly, North Atlantic Alliance’s activity poses a threat to the national 
security of Russia, especially – according to the authors of the strategy – strengthening 
of its military potential and further expansion of its influence, particularly near the Rus-
sian borders. Additionally, the strategy includes accusations against the United States 
of America and European Union, which by imposing an overthrow contradictory to the 
Constitution of Ukraine, led to the outbreak of military conflict in Eastern Ukraine and 
to the destabilisation near the border with Russia (Dekret, 2015).
Apart from directly indicating the entities threatening the security of Federation, 
strategy’s authors point out phenomenons which could potentially be dangerous to the 
internal situation of Russia. Main focus is drawn to “the practice of overthrowing legal 
political regimes, provoking instability and intra-state conflicts” (Dekret, 2015) which 
has lately been gaining popularity. Additionally, terrorism and the use of economic 
policy tools for political purposes have been deemed dangerous. Threats related to the 
development of new technologies and information (e.g., disinformation policy, crea-
tion of false profiles, information theft, etc.) are also being mentioned among other 
perils. One of the most thoroughly described risks is the one related to the activity 
of terrorist and extremist organisations, as well as other various associations (mainly 
those funded externally) which main objective is violation of the unity of Russia’s 
integrity, stability of its system and “violation of traditional Russian moral-spiritual 
values” (Dekret, 2015).
In the Russian National Security Strategy, close attention has been paid to the 
threats related to the economic sphere. Apart from listing the issues which Russian 
economy has been facing for many years (low competitiveness, high dependance on 
natural resources, informal sector, corruption), the authors of the strategy also men-
tioned that Russian economy is threatened by the actions of other members of the 
international economic system (for example, Western economic sanctions introduced 
after the annexation of Crimea) and by the regional and global economic crises, which 
cause instability of the system (Dekret, 2015).
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Russian National Security Strategy primarily focuses on recognising main threats; 
however, the most extensively characterised are those related to the external security, 
internal system stability and integrity of the state’s territory and the society. Natu-
rally, the document also includes paragraphs devoted to education, science, culture 
and healthcare; nonetheless, in these spheres, Russian strategies remain unchanged 
for years.
Destabilisation of the internal situation as a threat 
to security
Yefanova (2010) in his theoretical and terminological speculations proposes a connec-
tion of the security category with the concept of stability. Ensuring stability, i.e., inter-
nal longevity of state and its international surroundings is inseparably associated with 
assuring the safety of state. Three levels or types of stability can be distinguished: first 
is the stability of the military-political state leadership (permanent composition, legal-
ly defined terms of office). Second level concerns the stability of the political regime 
(maintaining current social-political system, evolutional nature of political changes, 
no political violence). While the third is the stability of the community, people (main-
taining the territorial integrity of state, assuring the personal safety and well-being of 
citizens, improving environmental protection and sustaining a demographic balance) 
(Yefanova, 2010). A consequence of merging the security category with stability cat-
egory is the acknowledgement that instability of one of the levels results in the loss of 
state security, or at least in its imbalance.
Protection against foreign agent
After mass anti-government protests on the turn of 2011 and 2012 and the Euro-
maidan, which began in Ukraine at the end of 2013 and ended in 2014, Russian legis-
lative system introduced at least a few new regulations, which aim was to ensure the 
stability of the system and eliminate the possibility of jeopardising its functioning. The 
changes, which are thought to be preventive to the potential destabilisation of internal 
situation in Russia, are the introduced in 2012 modifications to the federal law on non-
profit organisations. This amendment introduced a concept of “foreign agent” to the 
Russian law system; these are the non-governmental organisations that use external 
financial help. Limitations apply to those subjects which operate within the political 
sphere (including political actions and those that shape public opinion). Obligatory 
registration of non-governmental organisations (registry of foreign agents carried out 
by the Ministry) is a direct result of these regulations, but also an obligation to label 
all their publications and other works with “foreign agent.” Additionally, the organisa-
tions which are considered “foreign agents” are subjects to further, detailed controls 
(especially financial), and have been obliged to issuing activity reports more often.5 
5 As a result of the controls, 126 organisations were on the list of “foreign agents” in April 2016; 
among them Moscow’s Centre of Social and Workers’ Rights (Centum Praw Socjalnych i Pracown-
iczych), Kaliningrad’s Human Rights Centre (Centrum Praw Człowieka), Moscow’s Civic Education 
School (Szkoła Edukacji Obywatelskiej) and Institute of forecasting and solving political conflicts 
from Nizhny Novgorod (Svedeniya reyestra NKO). In 2014, GOLOS association, which protects 
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A failure to comply with the above-mentioned regulations can result in severe finan-
cial penalties, and in special cases, in imprisonment of its representatives (Federal’nyy 
zakon).
A protection of the internal security of the state was a justification for the intro-
duction of laws regarding externally funded non-governmental organisations. Sergey 
Markov (Russian politic, political scientist, State Duma’s deputy) admitted that the 
law’s aim is to lower the influence of other countries on state’s politics. Moreover, he 
acknowledged the leniency of the law in comparison to that of the United States’6 and 
decided that it should be recognised that everyone involved in politics wants to take 
over the power, hence externally funded entities should inform the society about their 
source of finance. If someone does not want to obey the new law, then, according to 
S. Markov, either works contrary to the Russian interests or wants to steal money given 
by foreign governments to fund non-governmental activities (Sinkin, 2012). In opinion 
of Russian political scientists – Tavmasyan and Rakitin (2017) – in times of high popu-
larity of hybrid warfare and involvement of foreign agents in internal conflicts of other 
countries (e.g., Ukrainian Revolution of 2013/2014), as well as possible influence of 
external forces on the society’s awareness, state’s control over organisations financed 
from abroad is an important element to the security strategy of Russia.
In relation to the changes in law on non-profit organisations, many critical voices 
arose; especially in relation to the negative reception of “foreign agent” by Russian 
society (it is associated with an idea of a spy, an agent from abroad, someone who is 
a threat to the safety and security of the state). Also, a vast majority of non-govern-
mental organisations that deal with the protection of human rights (what, according 
to Russian authorities, can be classified as political activity) are funded externally, 
because no Russian firm would support an activity which premise is to act against 
the state or its administration.7 Ресурсный правозащитный центр (Human Rights 
Resource Center), a Russian organisation providing information and legal aid to non-
governmental entities, created a report which analyses the effects of the changes in the 
voters’ rights, has been forcibly put on the foreign agents list. Previously, the association refused to 
voluntarily put itself on the list, for which it has been penalised with a fine. A permission to forcibly 
place foreign agents on the list has been granted to the Russian Federation Ministry of Justice through 
the amendment to the law on non-profit organisations signed by President V. Putin in June 2014. In 
order to be placed on the list, a court ruling is not necessary. An organisation can appeal against the 
decision (Rosja. Gołos).
6 Foreign Agents Registration Act, FARA, has been passed in the United States in 1938 in order 
to expose (only registration was required) political and quasi-political organisations that were con-
nected with foreign governments in any way (mainly financially). At that time, the act was meant 
to counter the expansion of nazi propaganda in pre-war America. Now it is used to register entities, 
which practice lobbying for other countries. It mostly pertains to activities of law firms and PR com-
panies, not non-governmental organisations controlled by the Russian version of the law. In 2017 
the Department of Justice, by the virtue of FARA, demanded registration of a worldwide television 
station Russia Today (RT) as a foreign agent financed by the Russian government of (Lusher, 2017). 
Russian authorities protested agains such actions of American administration.
7 According to Lyudmila Alexeyeva – chairwoman of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group – over 
90% of non-governmental organisations that deal with protection of human rights in Russia find 
funding abroad, since there is a lack of businesses that are not afraid of providing money to such enti-
ties. Currently there is no solution to this issue, unless more private companies, which are not scared 
of authorities, start operating in Russia. (Pravozashchitnitsa). 
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law on non-profit organisations. The research showed that Russian authorities broadly 
define organisations operating in a public sector, hence a significant number of them 
fell under the introduced restrictions. Any information about their activities shared 
online and in media, or their representatives taking part in public events are enough to 
be restricted by the new law («Inostrannyye agenty»). As a result, there is a decrease 
in society’s trust for the non-governmental organisations, and in willingness to devote 
their time to such activity.
unDesirable organisations
A 2015 act on undesirable organisations (or actually a group of amendments to the al-
ready functioning laws) perfectly suits the narrative of the necessity to protect Russian 
Federation’s national security. It enables forbidding operations of foreign and inter-
national organisations on Russian Federation’s territory without trial (Putin podpisal 
zakon). According to the act, a foreign or international organisation is deemed undesir-
able when it poses a threat to the foundation of the Russian system, its defence and 
security. As a consequence, the law prohibits such organisations from disseminating 
information through media (also Internet), and creating new entities; it also imposes 
strict monitoring of the already existing units. Additionally, working for such organisa-
tion can be punishable by up to 100,000 rubles, and, in special cases, even up to 6 years 
in jail (Putin podpisal zakon). The act allows Russian authorities to block the accounts 
of undesirable organisations and repress Russian organisations that work with those 
entities (an obligation to issue activity reports) (Putin podpisał).
According to the authors of the law – Aleksander Tarnawski (A Just Russia) and 
Anton Ishchenko (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia) – in the act they should be con-
sidered as a necessary precautionary measures that are assumed to protect the founda-
tions of constitutional system, national interests, due rights and interests of citizens, 
and security of the state (Zamahina, 2015). Essential, in this case, is precautionary se-
curity procedure – removal of entities that could, even potentially, support opposition 
in Russia. It is supposed to protect the Federation from incidents, such as those that 
took place in Ukraine. However, realistically evaluating the situation, this law again 
will hinder the functioning of entities that operate independently from authorities. It 
does not only concern the foreign organisations explicitly mentioned in the act, but 
also Russian entities that ever cooperated or received support (not necessarily finan-
cial, but for example expertise or problem solving) from foreign organisations. After 
the first two years, it is noticeable that the restrictions mainly affected organisations 
that support the growth of democracy and civil society.8 The authorities of Russian 
8 In 2018, on the list of foreign and international non-governmental organisations, which activ-
ity is deemed undesirable in Russian Federation, were i.a., National Endowment for Democracy 
(organisation promoting democracy abroad), OSI Assistance Foundation (organisation financially 
supporting democratic reforms, protection of human rights, access to information and economic de-
velopment), Open Society Foundation (organisation that promotes democracy, human right and open 
society), The U.S. Russia Foundation for Economic Advancement and the Rule of Law (organisation 
supporting the growth of market economy in Russia), National Democratic Institute for International 
Affairs (organisation supporting the efficiency of democratic institutions) and Open Russia Civic 
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Federation considered actions inspired and funded from abroad are dangerous to the 
internal security of their country.
NatioNal Guard protectiNG state security
In order to guarantee security of Russia and counteract the destabilisation of the in-
ternal situation, a new formation have been appointed in April 2016 – National Guard 
of Russia. A group of few hundred thousand professionally trained soldiers (it is esti-
mated – there are no official statistics – that in 2016 it included 170 thousand soldiers 
at its disposal, but the number can ultimately reach 300 thousand (Veroyatnuyu) re-
placed conscription of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, and 
took over the responsibilities of special police forces: (Special Purpose Police Unit) 
and SOBR (Special Unit [with/for a] Quick Reaction). Officially, the National Guard 
of Russia is a military organisation created to ensure national and public safety, protec-
tion of human rights and freedoms.9
A creation of specialised and dependent on the Russian President National Guard 
appears to be a natural consequence of the Russian National Security Strategy of 21 De-
cember 2015. As previously mentioned, this document, more than its previous version 
from six years ago, laid out the internal issues and threats to the security of Russia. 
Although NATO and the United States were pointed out as the main enemies (North 
Atlantic Alliance being an extension of USA’s activity), potential “colour revolutions”10 
and “radical social groups that implement nationalist and extremist religious ideologies, 
foreign and international non-governmental organisations, as well as private citizens 
who work against the territorial integrity of Russia and destabilise political processes” 
(Czerniewicz, 2016) were also considered challenges to the Russian security. Such de-
fined threats perfectly fit into the job description of National Guard (with an emphasis on 
“fighting extremists” that are radical social groups, but also ordinary citizens who public-
ly criticise the power). Moreover, the new security strategy, more often than the previous 
one, refers to the collective values (public order, country’s integrity, independence of po-
litical entity, instead of the growth of individual, its rights and freedoms) (Dekret, 2015), 
which are meant to be protected by the National Guard. Viktor Zolotow – Director of 
the National Guard – also addressed the internal security category and protection against 
numerous threats (economic crisis, terrorism, migration).11 Hence it appears reasonable 
to qualify the emergence of the new formation as one of the elements of the system of 
strengthening the Russian Federation’s internal security.
Movement (organisation that promotes democracy and human rights in Russia, founded by M. Kho-
dorovsky) (Perechen’ inostrannykh).
9 The definition has been included in the Federal Act of 3 July 2016 “O voyskakh natsional’noy 
gvardii Rossiyskoy Federatsii” passed by the State Duma (22 June 2016) and Federation Council 
(29 June 2016) and approved by the President of Russian Federation. 
10 In Russia, colour revolutions are uncontrollable outbreaks of social rebellion aimed at chang-
ing the power or political system.
11 During Zolotowv’s raport presentation at Federal Council entitled: O sostoyanii i perspekti-
vakh stroitel’stva voysk natsional’noy gvardii Rossiyskoy Federatsii na srednesrochnuyu perspektivu 
(Direktor).
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anti-terrorist laws
Counter-terrorism bill passed in 201612 (also called Yarovaya bill, from the name of 
Irina Yarovaya – State Duma’s deputy – who, together with Viktor Ozerov, submitted 
the bill) was created to counter potential threats to the Russian national security. The 
bill included regulations, which increase penalties for social media activity, considered 
terrorist-related by the law enforcement authorities. After amendments, online activity 
is classified similarly to media activity. These regulations also introduce restrictions 
on leaving the country for people convicted of particular crimes (mainly terrorist and 
extremist crimes13), rise penalties for participation in organising mass riots, and intro-
duce the possibility for security services to inspect private correspondence and phone 
calls of people on Russian territory.14 Russian literature includes discussions, in which 
extremism is considered one of the biggest threats to the security of Russia. Volosyuk 
(2014) warns that extremism should not be treated as a marginal phenomenon, but as 
a powerful occurrence of organised crime with clearly defined political objectives, 
which can only be achieved through violence. Whereas, Magomedov, Krotov, Samy-
gin (2016) consider extremism – next to corruption – as one of the greatest threats to 
the security of Russian Federation. New legislation proves that country’s authorities 
identified the danger and decided to counteract.
suMMary
After the experiences of Arab Spring, Euromaidan and mass post-election protests 
(2011/2012), in the biggest Russian cities the authorities started paying more attention, 
in their actions and new legislation, to the issue of internal security. Potential desta-
bilisation of internal situation has been defined as one of the greatest threats to Rus-
sian security. Instances of that can be found mainly in the Russian National Security 
Strategy amended in 2015, where the possible internal dangers have been meticulously 
characterised. As a response to the strategy’s evaluations, Russian legislative system 
introduced laws, which aim at preventing these potential threats. The purpose of the 
law which introduced the concepts of foreign agent and undesirable organisations, is 
to forestall possible interference into the political system and public space of Russian 
12 Some of the amendments introduced by this bill, i.a., the new obligations imposed on telecom-
munications companies (storing call registers and all correspondence of the network’s users), have 
been postponed due to the unreadiness of mobile network providers. Members of the telecommu-
nication market criticised introduced regulations, mainly because of the compulsion to prepare new 
infrastructure and high cost of its maintenance (Dukhanova, Chursina, 2018). 
13 A concept of extremist activity is very unclear in Russia. At the beginning of 2018, Michaił 
Listow’s case has been heavily discussed on Russian social media, who two years later on his Vkon-
takte profile shared a well-known photo of Moscow Victory Parade of 1945 (the photo depicted Red 
Army soldiers, throwing Nazi flags on the ground). When M. Listow engaged in the campaign for 
Alexei Navalny, police initiated proceedings against him, and accused him of publicly demonstrating 
Nazi symbols based on that photo. Listow has been considered extremist by the judge (what signifi-
cantly impedes life in Russia) and punished with a fine (Nawalny, 2018).
14 Majority of the changes introduced by Yarovaya bill have been discussed in the analysis pre-
pared by the journalist of Meduza news page (Najbardziej drakońskie).
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Federation from abroad. A main objective of the new formation – National Guard 
– is defending the stable internal situation and foundations of its existence. Also, the 
newly introduced anti-terrorist laws are meant to prevent the potential dangers to the 
national security; however, critics of the introduced resolutions point out that a sig-
nificant limitation of operating space for citizens’ initiatives and organisations which 
aim at development of the civil society, are the results of the new regulations. Hence, 
it can be said that Russian authorities fear not only the destabilisation of the internal 
situation stimulated from abroad (e.g., through other countries’ operations), but also 
by their own citizens, who could potentially desire a change in the Russian political 
system. Such enemy has been targeted with multidimensional solutions, mainly legal, 
but also military.
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ABSTRACT
For the first time internal security has been clearly articulated in Russian National Security 
Strategy of December 2015. That is when the so-called colour revolutions and “radical social 
groups which use nationalist and extremist religious ideologies, foreign and international non-
governmental organisations, as well as private citizens who act against the Russian territorial 
integrity and destabilise political processes” have been deemed the most significant challenges 
to the Russian security, together with the North Atlantic Alliance and the United States of Amer-
ica. As a response to such defined threats, Russian legislation introduced solutions that attempt 
to prevent the danger. The aim of this article is to answer the question, whether Russian authori-
ties treat the destabilisation of internal situation as one of the main challenges to the Russian 
security, and if yes, what are the indications of that? Does Russian legislation (especially from 
the last few years), actions of the Russian authorities and Russian subject literature, include 
evidence confirming this hypothesis?
 
Keywords: Russia’s security; national security, Russia’s security strategy, non-governmental 
organizations, National Guard
Destabilizacja sytuacji wewnętrznej jako jeDno z głównych 
zagrożeń bezpieczeństwa FeDeracji rosyjskiej 
 
STRESZCZENIE
Bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne po raz pierwszy wyraźnie wyartykułowane zostało w Rosyjskiej 
Strategii Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego z grudnia 2015 r. To wtedy, tuż obok zagrożenia ze 
strony Organizacji Paktu Północnoatlantyckiego oraz Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki, za naj-
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większe wyzwania dla rosyjskiego bezpieczeństwa uznano również tzw. kolorowe rewolucje 
oraz „radykalne społeczne grupy, które używają nacjonalistycznych i religijnych ekstremistycz-
nych ideologii, zagraniczne i międzynarodowe organizacje pozarządowe, jak też prywatnych 
obywateli, którzy działają przeciwko terytorialnej integralności Rosji i destabilizują procesy 
polityczne”. W odpowiedzi na tak zdefiniowane zagrożenia, w rosyjskim prawodawstwie poja-
wiły się rozwiązania, które tym wewnętrznym zagrożeniom mają zapobiec. Celem artykułu jest 
odpowiedź na pytanie, czy rosyjskie władze traktują destabilizację sytuacji wewnętrznej jako 
jedno z głównych wyzwań dla bezpieczeństwa Rosji, a jeśli tak, to co o tym może świadczyć?
 
słowa kluczowe: bezpieczeństwo Rosji; bezpieczeństwo narodowe, strategia bezpieczeństwa 
Rosji, organizacje pozarządowe, Gwardia Narodowa
